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Abstract 
Social epistemology studies knowledge in social contexts. Knowledge 
is ‘social’ when its holder communicates with or learns from others 
(Epistemology in groups), or when its holder is a group as a whole, 
literally or metaphorically (Epistemology of groups). Group knowledge 
can emerge explicitly, through aggregation procedures like voting, or 
implicitly, through institutions like deliberation or prediction markets. In 
the truth-tracking paradigm, group beliefs aim at truth, and group 
decisions at ‘correctness’ – in virtue of external facts that are empirical 
or normative, real or constructed, universal or relativistic, etc. 
Procedures and institutions are evaluated by epistemic performance: 
Are they truth-conducive? Do groups become ‘wiser’ than their 
members? We review several procedures and institutions, discussing 
epistemic successes and failures. Jury theorems provide formal 
arguments for epistemic success. Some jury theorems misleadingly 
conclude that ‘huge groups are infallible’ – an artefact of inappropriate 
premises. Others have defensible premises, and still conclude that 
groups outperform individuals, without being infallible. 
Social Epistemology is the branch of Epistemology which studies 
knowledge in social contexts. In this review, we first set the stage by 
introducing clarifications, distinctions, and applications (Section 1). We then 
discuss formal procedures (Section 2) and informal institutional 
arrangements (Section 3) which generate collective beliefs or decisions that 
‘track the truth’, or instead lead to epistemic failures (Section 4).  
1 Scope and problems of social epistemology 
1.1 Epistemology in groups versus epistemology of groups 
A first distinction pertains to the knowledge holder, who is either a group 
member or the group as a whole. Epistemology in groups might be regarded 
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as a species of individual epistemology, though its focus lies in how 
individual knowledge depends on social inputs; typical questions are 
rational responses to testimony and peer disagreement, and ‘irrational’ or 
sub-personal responses such as belief contagion and belief change through 
mass media. By contrast, epistemology of groups ascribes knowledge to 
the group as a whole; let us talk here of social knowledge or belief (List and 
Pettit 2011; cf. Goldman and Blanchard 2018, Schmitt 1999). The meaning 
and status of social knowledge or belief is controversial. The group in 
question can be more or less structured and cohesive, with implications for 
whether the group can qualify as an agent, and for what it means for the 
group to believe or know something, ranging from literal to purely 
metaphorical meanings. For instance, a committee, firm or state (if treated 
as an agent) can believe something literally, while a prediction market or the 
random group participating in a survey can believe something only in some 
metaphorical sense. List (2014) distinguishes between three types of social 
beliefs: aggregate beliefs are mere summaries of the beliefs of group 
members; common beliefs are ultimately individual beliefs held by each 
group member, with a common awareness of these beliefs; and corporate 
beliefs are beliefs of the group in a literal sense, which presupposes that the 
group qualifies as an agent. Theoretical distinctions aside, it is evident that 
we routinely invoke social knowledge or beliefs, for instance when saying 
that we know something or that prediction markets “knew” in advance that 
Obama would become president of the United States. In a formal analysis, 
our distinction between epistemology in groups and of groups is sharp: the 
former is studied using belief revision models, the latter using aggregation 
models. In this review, we focus on epistemology of groups. We refer to Rott 
[to be added] for individual belief revision in groups. 
1.2 Social knowledge versus social decisions 
Narrowly construed, social epistemology addresses social knowledge or 
belief, not social action: it addresses how a legal court learns whether the 
defendant is guilty, not how it decides whether to convict him; how a 
community of physicists discovers a law, not how it decides whether to 
perform an experiment; etc. Broadly construed, however, social 
epistemology also addresses social decisions, like courts passing 
sentences, scientists choosing an experiment, parliaments passing laws, 
governments setting goals, commissions working out ethical standards, etc. 
For a social decision to qualify as an epistemic matter, it must have the 
property of being (in some relevant sense) correct or incorrect in virtue of 
some fact or truth. A court sentence may well be an epistemic matter, being 
correct or incorrect depending on whether the crime has been committed 
and merits the sentence. Selecting Oscar winners might be regarded as an 
epistemic matter. One might adopt this inclusive notion of social 
epistemology because correct decisions often are or can be rationalized as 
the result of true beliefs.3  
1.3 The truth to be tracked 
One can distinguish between three different types of facts that make social 
beliefs true or false, or social decisions correct or incorrect: logical, 
empirical, and normative facts. For example: 
• The mathematical community forms mathematical beliefs. Correctness 
depends on logical facts. 
• The monetary policy committee of a central bank predicts whether 
inflation will rise. Correctness depends on empirical facts. 
• A group of doctors decides whether to shift funds from medical research 
to patient treatment. Correctness depends on normative and empirical 
facts. 
Social epistemology with normative facts is controversial, since both the 
existence and the nature of normative facts is debatable. Some would 
therefore prefer a proceduralist justification of social decisions, at least for 
decisions of a normative kind. But this conclusion may be premature, since 
truth-tracking is meaningful regardless of whether normative facts are real 
or constructed (e.g., socially constructed); universal or relativistic (as in 
cultural relativism); or natural or non-natural. The fact should, however, be 
suitably stable and procedure-independent; otherwise there is no stable 
truth to be tracked. 
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1.4 Social knowledge, justification, and reliability 
Most well-known problems about individual knowledge carry over to social 
knowledge. For instance, it is controversial whether knowledge is justified 
true belief, a thesis threatened by so-called Gettier cases, in which a subject 
(for us: a group) forms justified true beliefs out of sheer luck (Gettier 1963). 
It is also controversial whether justification to hold a belief comes from 
having sufficient evidence or rather from using a reliable procedure (see 
Goldman and Beddor 2016 on evidentialism versus reliabilism). Despite 
their familiarity, such ‘knowledge problems’ can take a distinctive form for 
social rather than individual knowledge, notably because groups use 
different procedures than individuals to acquire beliefs (e.g., voting 
procedures). Nonetheless, we shall set aside the question of what exactly 
social knowledge means and zoom in on social beliefs and the question of 
which institutions, social arrangements and aggregation procedures track 
the truth, i.e., produce true social beliefs or correct social decisions 
(Goldman 1999).  
1.5 Social epistemology applied to epistemic democracy 
Social epistemology is partly a positive theory of which institutions and 
procedures do track the truth. By contrast, the epistemic theory of 
democracy is a thoroughly normative theory, arguing that (democratic) 
institutions or procedures should track the truth to be legitimate. The rival 
normative theory, proceduralism, maintains that (democratic) institutions or 
procedures should not track any independent truth, but be procedurally fair, 
which often means that voters should have an equal say and alternatives 
should get an equal chance. The difference is fundamental: if there is an 
Oracle of Delphi that always tells the truth, then the procedure of blindly 
implementing what the oracle recommends for society is epistemically good 
(it tracks the truth), but procedurally bad (it is totally undemocratic). The 
debate between proponents of epistemic and procedural theories of 
democracy is ongoing. For epistemic theories of democracy, social 
epistemology is a highly relevant enterprise (Estlund 2008). For a hybrid 
position, see Peter (2007).  
2 Aggregation procedures to track the truth 
We now discuss prominent procedures generating social beliefs (Section 
2.1) or truth-tracking decisions (Section 2.2), and then sketch how jury 
theorems help to establish the truth-conduciveness of such procedures 
(Section 2.3). 
2.1 Forming social beliefs 
Aggregating beliefs on a single proposition. A group of individuals is 
interested in whether a given proposition p is true. For instance, an 
economic panel is interested in whether inflation will rise, or a jury in whether 
the defendant has committed the crime. Each group member holds a belief 
about p, in the binary form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. An aggregation procedure takes 
the individual beliefs about p as input and returns a social belief about p as 
output. We allow social abstentions, so that society says neither yes nor no 
to p (but for simplicity we exclude individual abstentions). We now give 
examples. Majority rule: society believes what the majority believes (and 
abstains in case of a tie). Asymmetric supermajority rules: these make 
social belief of p harder to achieve than social disbelief, by requiring a 
supermajority support for a social ‘yes’ while otherwise opting for a social 
‘no’. Symmetric supermajority rules: these make social ‘yes’ and ‘no’ equally 
hard to achieve, by requiring the same supermajority support for each. This 
often results in social abstention, especially for high thresholds. Extreme 
cases of (asymmetric or symmetric) supermajority rules are (asymmetric or 
symmetric) unanimity rules, in which the supermajority threshold is a 
unanimity threshold. Later, in section 2.3, we analyze how likely it is that 
resulting social beliefs track the truth. 
Aggregating beliefs about multiple propositions: judgment aggregation. 
Many groups are interested simultaneously in the truth of different 
propositions, something referred to as a judgment-aggregation problem 
(e.g., List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2007). For instance, a court may need 
collective beliefs about three propositions: the defendant has committed an 
act (p); such an act breaks the law (q); the defendant has broken the law 
(r). A judgment-aggregation problem does not simply reduce to several 
belief-aggregation problems about a single proposition each, because the 
propositions in question are typically logically interconnected. If in our court 
example the court comes to believe p and q, then it must believe r. 
Disbelieving r would be logically inconsistent. Abstaining on r (neither 
believing nor disbelieving r) would be deductively unclosed. The trouble is 
that voting on each relevant proposition in isolation often generates 
inconsistent and deductively unclosed social beliefs: even if each member 
of court holds consistent and complete (and thus deductively closed) beliefs, 
it may happen that a majority believes p, another majority believes q, and 
yet a majority disbelieves r. This phenomenon is referred to as the doctrinal 
paradox (Kornhauser and Sager 1986) or the discursive dilemma (Pettit 
2001). The discursive dilemma generalizes far beyond propositionwise 
majority voting. General impossibility theorems establish that there exist no 
propositionwise judgment-aggregation procedures which are well-behaved 
in some sense, as soon as propositions are sufficiently interconnected; see 
in particular List and Pettit’s (2002) theorem and the Arrow-type theorem for 
judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List 2007 and Dokow and Holzman 
2010, building on Nehring and Puppe 2010). So, whether a proposition is 
socially believed must depend not only on the individual beliefs about this 
proposition, but also on the individual beliefs about other propositions. This 
holistic nature of social beliefs makes social beliefs a more interesting and 
less transparent concept. The most famous holistic procedure to form social 
beliefs is the premise-based procedure (e.g., Pettit 2001, Dietrich and 
Mongin 2010). In our court example, this procedure determines the social 
belief on the propositions p and q (the premise propositions) through a 
majority vote on each of these propositions, while logically deducing the 
social belief about r (the conclusion proposition). So r is socially believed if 
and only if p and q are both socially believed. This is holistic since the social 
belief about r is no longer determined only by the individual beliefs about r, 
potentially overruling a majority belief about r. But the premise-based 
procedure comes with its own problems; for instance, it presupposes we 
can prioritize certain (premise) propositions over other (conclusion) 
propositions. Rival holistic procedures are distance-based rules (e.g., Miller 
and Osherson 2008), sequential rules (e.g., List 2004, Dietrich 2015), 
relevance-based rules (Dietrich 2015) and ‘approximate majoritarian’ rules 
(Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2014). 
Probabilistic opinion pooling. If we adopt the Bayesian paradigm, social 
beliefs should come in degrees rather than in binary yes/no form. What 
probabilities should society assign to propositions, given the probabilities 
assigned by the individuals? This is the so-called opinion-pooling problem 
– the probabilistic counterpart of the judgment-aggregation problem (for 
reviews, see Genest and Zidek 1986; Dietrich and List 2016). Once beliefs 
are probabilistic rather than binary, coherence of beliefs consists in 
respecting principles of probability theory like additivity, rather than logical 
principles like logical consistency and deductive closure. The picture 
reverses entirely: propositionwise (‘local’) aggregation of beliefs no longer 
runs into trouble. The social probability of any proposition can simply be the 
average (or a weighted average) of the individual probabilities, which 
guarantees coherent social beliefs as long as individual beliefs are 
coherent. Such ‘linear averaging’ procedures have been characterized 
axiomatically by McConway (1981), Wagner (1982), Mongin (1995), and 
Dietrich and List (2017). Although social beliefs produced by linear 
averaging are coherent, they are not fully Bayesian. Bayesianism is usually 
taken to require two things: holding beliefs in probabilistic form 
(“probabilism”), and revising beliefs through Bayes’ rule 
(“conditionalization”). Social beliefs generated by linear averaging violate 
the second requirement: they fail to be revised via Bayes’ rule. Why? 
Assume some proposition is learnt, so that every individual revises his or 
her beliefs (via Bayes’ rule, assuming that individuals are Bayesian). If at 
any time the current social beliefs are the average of the current individual 
beliefs, then the post-information social beliefs usually differ from the initial 
social beliefs updated via Bayes’ rule. In short, this social belief revision is 
non-Bayesian. Opinion pooling through geometric rather than linear 
averaging repairs this flaw, i.e., produces dynamically rational social beliefs. 
In fact, geometric opinion pooling is the only way to guarantee ‘Bayesian’ 
group beliefs of a suitably well-behaved sort, as has only recently been 
shown (Russell et al. 2015, Dietrich forth.). 
Aggregating evaluations – absolute versus ordinal approach. Certain 
objects – e.g., wines, political candidates, holiday destinations – must be 
evaluated in terms of some criterion, e.g., moral value, well-being, aesthetic 
value, or size. Let this be an epistemic problem: evaluations express beliefs 
about facts of some kind – which is plausible for size evaluations and more 
controversial for other evaluations. A first question is whether value is 
measured in absolute or ordinal terms. Consider the set X of objects 
evaluated. Ordinal evaluations are captured by a binary relation ≽ on X, 
where ‘x ≽ y’ means that x is at least as valuable as y (w.r.t. the relevant 
criterion)’. Absolute evaluations are captured by a function assigning to 
each object in X a value from a set V of possible values, e.g., from {very 
good, good, ...} (moral evaluation), or {beautiful, ugly, …} (aesthetic 
evaluation), or {large, medium, …} (size evaluation), or a set of numbers 
(numerical evaluations, e.g., of size). What should be the social evaluations 
of objects, given the evaluations by its members? 
• In the ordinal case, this problem is structurally the notorious preference-
aggregation problem, reinterpreting preference relations as value-
judgment relations. One of many proposals is to use pairwise majority 
voting: object x is socially ranked over object y if and only if more 
individuals rank x over y than y over x. This procedure can lead to social 
cycles: some object x is majority-ranked over another y, which is majority-
ranked over another z, which is majority-ranked over x, Condorcet’s 
voting paradox. It generalizes into Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 
1963): very roughly, not just pairwise majority voting, but any pairwise 
aggregation procedure is flawed. 
• The picture is brighter when aggregating absolute evaluations – an 
aggregation problem called the social grading problem by Balinski and 
Laraki (2011). In case of just two possible values – ‘approved’ and ‘non-
approved’ – the most natural procedure is ‘approval voting’: an object is 
socially approved if the number of individuals approving it is at least as 
high as for each other object, and socially non-approved otherwise 
(Brams and Fishburn 2007). Balinski and Laraki generalize this 
procedure to any set of values linearly ranked from ‘highest’ to ‘lowest’, 
e.g., {good, medium, bad}, where ‘good’ ranks above ‘medium’ which 
ranks above ‘bad’. To socially evaluate an object x, first order the 
individuals such that the first individual evaluates x at least as highly as 
the second; the second at least as highly as the third; etc. The social 
value of x is the value assigned to x by the middle individual in that order 
(assuming an odd number of individuals for simplicity). So, if in a wine 
evaluation among three judges some wine receives the evaluations 
(exquisite, exquisite, drinkable), then this wine is socially evaluated as 
exquisite. This so-called majority-judgment rule (one might have called it 
the median rule) has several appealing features (see Balinski and Laraki 
2011), but remains controversial within social choice theory with its 
ordinalist tradition. 
The aggregation of evaluations can be regarded as a special case of 
judgment aggregation, namely over either ordinal ranking propositions of 
type ‘x ranks over y’ (for options x and y in X), or absolute value propositions 
of type ‘x has value v’ (for options x in X and values v in V). 
2.2 Making social decisions  
The procedures discussed above generate social beliefs of different sorts. 
We now turn to procedures for making social decisions. To stay within social 
epistemology (broadly construed), we assume the decisions in question 
track some truth, i.e., can be ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ in some procedure-
independent sense (see Sections 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5). For example, a group 
might have to choose a member from a set K of social alternatives. K could 
contain just two alternatives, as when a court decides whether to convict or 
acquit the defendant. K could instead contain many alternatives, as when a 
court decides between different sentences. In so-called plurality rule, each 
individual votes for exactly one alternative in K, and society chooses the 
alternative receiving the highest number of votes (or one such alternative in 
case of a tie). Plurality rule reduces to simple majority rule in the two-
alternative case. In the many-alternative case, plurality rule can lead to 
problems: Suppose alternative k* in K is the ‘correct’ alternative. Plurality 
rule will normally fail to select k* if K contains many alternatives similar to k* 
(‘clones’ of k*), because k* will tend to lose votes to its clones. Worse, 
plurality will usually not even select one of the ‘approximately correct’ clones 
of k*, because these clones will themselves tend to lose votes to similar 
alternatives. One response is to replace plurality rule by approval voting, in 
which individuals can vote for any number of alternatives and the most often 
approved alternative wins; here the correct alternative will not tend to lose 
votes to its clones because individuals can approve many alternatives. 
Another response is to base the social choice on how each individual ranks 
alternatives from ‘best’ to ‘worst’. Here we aggregate individual rankings into 
a socially winning alternative (or set of winning alternatives, if ties are 
permitted). This aggregation problem differs structurally from the 
preference-aggregation problem mentioned above, in that social outputs 
are winning alternatives rather than rankings of alternatives. Procedures 
with such outputs are called social-choice rules rather than preference-
aggregation rules. Nonetheless, the logical difficulties surrounding 
preference aggregation – illustrated by Condorcet’s voting paradox and 
culminating in Arrow’s Theorem – reemerge for social choice procedures. 
For instance, there may not exist any ‘Condorcet winner’, an alternative that 
is majority-ranked over each other alternative – a problem closely related to 
Condorcet’s voting paradox. 
2.3 Jury theorems: formal truth-tracking arguments 
Do aggregation procedures like those just introduced succeed in tracking 
the truth? Jury theorems provide formal ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments, to 
the effect that appropriate procedures – typically majoritarian procedures – 
tend to generate true social beliefs, or ‘correct’ social decisions. Jury 
theorems can be powerful instruments – but they can also convey a 
misleading message when applied wrongly, because their optimistic 
conclusions may rely on misguided assumptions. The simplest and most 
common jury theorem is Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem. It assumes a 
majority vote between two social alternatives of which exactly one is 
‘correct’ or ‘better’, for instance whether or not to convict or acquit a 
defendant. Jury theorems address the effect of increasing the size of the 
group. They ‘‘typically conclude that ‘crowds are wise’ in one or both of the 
following senses: 
• The growing-reliability thesis: Larger groups are better truth-trackers. 
That is, they are more likely to select the correct alternative (by majority) 
than smaller groups or single individuals. 
• The infallibility thesis: Huge groups are infallible truth-trackers. That is, 
the likelihood of a correct (majority) decision tends to full certainty as the 
group becomes larger and larger.’’ (Dietrich and Spiekermann forth.) 
Different jury theorems differ in which of the two conclusions they reach and 
which premises they rest on. For instance, Condorcet’s theorem reaches 
both conclusions, based on two simple premises: an independence 
assumption whereby voters have independent probabilities of voting for the 
correct alternative, and a competence assumption whereby these correct-
voting probabilities exceed ½ and are the same for each voter. The 
theorem’s infallibility conclusion follows easily from the law of large 
numbers. The theorem’s growing-reliability conclusion follows from a more 
sophisticated combinatorial argument. The infallibility conclusion is overly 
optimistic and has left many with the (correct) impression that ‘something’ 
must be wrong with jury theorems that reach that conclusion, although there 
is confusion about the source of the problem. Some blame Condorcet’s 
competence assumption, arguing that real groups contain some 
incompetent individuals; while the competence assumption is indeed 
untenable as such, it can be weakened without reversing the infallibility 
conclusion, namely to the more plausible assumption that average 
competence in the group exceeds ½ (Owen et al. 1989; Dietrich 2008). The 
real problem is the independence assumption. Although this assumption 
can too be weakened without reversing the infallibility conclusion (e.g., 
Pivato 2017 and the literature reviewed in Dietrich and Spiekermann forth.), 
plausible weakenings of independence make the infallibility conclusion 
collapse (Dietrich and List 2004, Dietrich 2008). An important source of 
independence failure comes from common causes affecting voters: 
common evidence, common theoretical paradigms, or even ‘non-evidential’ 
common causes such as room temperature (Dietrich and Spiekermann 
2013). The limited nature of available evidence places objective limits on 
the reliability of majority judgments, which cannot be miraculously overcome 
by including more and more voters exposed to the same limited evidence. 
But it would be hasty to dismiss jury theorems. Although the infallibility 
conclusion is too optimistic, the growing-reliability conclusion can be saved: 
that conclusion is reached by a jury theorem, which revises Condorcet’s 
independence and competence assumptions in defensible ways (Dietrich 
and Spiekermann 2013). In other work, Condorcet’s jury theorem has been 
extended beyond binary social decisions, such as choices between many 
alternatives via plurality voting (List and Goodin 2001) and premise-based 
judgment aggregation (List 2005). In fact, almost any standard voting rule 
has a corresponding jury theorem.4 The question is thus not whether jury 
theorems ‘exist’ to defend a given aggregation rule, but whether those 
theorems make acceptable premises. While standard jury theorems 
address the epistemic performance of a given procedure (usually majority 
voting), one may alternatively search for the epistemically optimal procedure 
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which typically departs from majority voting, notably because of differential 
competence across individuals (Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 1997, Dietrich 
2006). 
3 Institutions beyond mere aggregation 
Besides voting procedures, there are many other institutional and social 
processes for promoting social knowledge and correct social decisions. In 
this section we give three important examples: prediction markets, 
deliberation, and distributed search. Like belief aggregation procedures and 
other voting rules, prediction markets have predefined objects on their 
agenda (propositions, events, alternatives etc.). Deliberation, by contrast, is 
a more open and malleable process. Distributed search is different again, 
dividing cognitive labor in a structured way to solve complex problems. 
3.1 Prediction markets 
Suppose we want to predict whether a future event E will take place, such 
as “Bernie Sanders will be nominated as a candidate for the presidential 
election in the US in 2020 by the Democratic Party”. We could ask a large 
number of people whether they believe this will happen. Alternatively, we 
could create a prediction market for winner-takes-all “event futures” that pay 
out $1 if the event takes place, and $0 if it does not. Starting from some 
initial allocation of these futures, traders can buy and sell them on a market 
created for that purpose. The market price for the future indicates the 
probability of the event, Pr(E). This is because the value of a future is the 
expected payout, which equals Pr(E) x $1. Traders thinking the current 
market price is below the event probability buy, traders thinking the opposite 
sell (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). 
The mechanisms behind successful prediction markets are aggregation and 
incentivization (Mann 2016). We have already seen that aggregation 
through voting can track the truth. The clever addition of prediction markets 
is the incentive created by gains when the future is under- or overprized. 
The competitive setting motivates participants to try to outwit others by 
finding more information. The prediction market is ‘’successful’’ when it 
predicts – more precisely, attaches high price (probability) to – events that 
eventually happen. Prediction markets have often successfully predicted 
political events (see, e.g., the Iowa Electronic Markets5), but also business 
events, sports events, and even scientific events (Arrow et al 2008; Dreber 
et al. 2015). However, they are not infallible, mostly because of inefficient 
markets, systematic mistakes of traders, and insufficient or misleading 
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information. For example, the Iowa Prediction Markets wrongly predicted a 
‘’no’’ in the Brexit referendum and a Clinton victory over Trump in the 2016 
US presidential election.6 Prediction markets tend to perform best when the 
payout conditions are well-defined, the event happens in the near future, 
there are many market participants with access to independent evidence, 
and sources of systematic bias are limited. 
3.2 Deliberation  
The procedures discussed so far emphasize information merging, be it via 
aggregation rules or prediction markets. Deliberation, by contrast, 
emphasizes the exchange of reasons, prior to or instead of an aggregation. 
Is deliberation truth-conducive? Several epistemic effects are conceivable: 
(i) Deliberation can make private information or reasons public and allow 
participants to incorporate information and reasons of others; (ii) critical 
exchanges can eliminate bad reasons or inconsistencies and make good 
reasons and consistent viewpoints stand out more; (iii) deliberation might 
eliminate biases and reduce the influence of opinion leaders or other 
common causes; (iv) while deliberating, the decision problem can evolve, 
as new options come on the agenda and existing issues are reframed 
(Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, ch. 9); (v) deliberation can induce a meta-
consensus about the structure of the decision space (Dryzek and List 2003; 
cf. List 2003, Dietrich and List 2010).  
A good overview of the deliberation literature is Bächtiger et al. (2018); 
Landemore (2017) is helpful for the epistemic aspect. Extensive empirical 
research on “deliberative polls” suggests many benefits of deliberation (e.g., 
Fishkin 2018 and much of his other work). It is particularly striking that 
opportunities to deliberate with decision makers increase political 
knowledge (Esterling et al. 2011), though it is hard to disentangle whether 
this is an effect of the deliberative process or opportunities for influence. 
However, there are also warnings that deliberation can lead to increased 
polarization (Sunstein 2002). 
3.3 Distributed Search  
Some problems are best tackled by dividing epistemic labor. Scientific 
research, for example, progresses not because all scientists work on the 
same problems, with the same frameworks, theories, evidence, etc., but 
because of a competitive diversity of approaches, with incentive structures 
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rewarding originality (Kitcher 1993, Strevens 2003). In a similar vein, some 
have argued that federalism is an epistemically advantageous political 
system because different political sub-units can search for and try out 
different solutions to a problem, an advantage that Judge Brandeis (1932) 
referred to as the “laboratory” of federalism. Distributed search is particularly 
suitable when (i) the search domain is large, e.g., many rival theories could 
be tested; and (ii) identifying correct choices requires effort, e.g., testing a 
theory (to an extent sufficient for acceptance or rejection) is an expensive 
and lengthy process. Such epistemic problems can be modelled in different 
ways (e.g., Zollman 2010; Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, Hong and Page 
2012). The theoretical results suggest that division of epistemic labor is 
typically most productive if a balance is struck between diversity and 
learning. A group that eliminates diversity too quickly by converging on one 
candidate solution may miss better options. By contrast, a group that does 
not learn from the results that its members feed back will not benefit from 
the evidence the distributed search unearthed. 
4 Some Sources of Social Epistemic Failure 
We have already encountered several reasons why groups can fail to form 
true beliefs or to make correct decisions: its members can fall prey to biases, 
be influenced by opinion leaders or follow misleading evidence. In this 
section, we briefly review some further sources of social epistemic failure. 
Most epistemic failures begin as individual failures, pertaining to 
epistemology in groups. But since individual beliefs shape group beliefs, 
individual failures become social failures and may even get amplified 
through deliberation or aggregation. So they also pertain to epistemology of 
groups, our main focus. An exception is strategic voting, which involves no 
false individual beliefs, but may lead to social epistemic failures. 
Strategic Voting. Even if voters care for nothing but true social beliefs or 
correct social decisions, they can have a strategic incentive to misrepresent 
their own view – which is surprising given the absence of conflicting goals. 
Consider a majority decision between options x and y. Voter Ann personally 
attaches high probability to x being the correct option. Instead of voting for 
x, she reasons as follows. Her vote makes a difference (is ‘pivotal’) only if 
the other voters are equally split between x and y (let the total number of 
voters be odd). Thinking strategically, Ann ignores all cases where she is 
not pivotal and assumes that x and y receive equal support from the others. 
But (so she reasons) if half of the others believe y to be correct, half of the 
others must have recognized a quality in y that she is unaware of. She infers 
that y is probably the correct option, and therefore votes for y, against her 
individual judgment (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996).7 Is such strategic 
voting an epistemic failure or enhancement? One might suspect the latter, 
given that individuals strategize in order to improve social beliefs. However, 
strategic voting equilibria can be epistemically worse than non-strategic 
voting because strategic voters discard private information. Fortunately, 
voters often have rational grounds for voting non-strategically. For example, 
they may care about expressing their own view instead of (or in addition to) 
caring about correctness of the voting outcome (Dietrich and Spiekermann 
forth.). 
Social pressure. A potent cause of epistemic failure is the desire to conform 
with perceived expectations or norms, to avoid conflict or cognitive 
dissonance, to avoid mistakes in public, or to please peers. For example, 
group deliberation is likely to over-emphasize information that was already 
widely accepted prior to deliberation and under-emphasize information that 
is sparsely spread and yet crucial for a correct decision. Such an under-
emphasis can happen not just because fewer people can mention the 
information, but also because those who can mention it stay silent, 
predicting, perhaps correctly, that the information will be controversial 
(Stasser and Titus 2011; Gigone and Hastie 1993). Related effects of social 
pressure are the amplification of individual errors in deliberation, and the 
possible enforcement of extreme positions – two deliberation failures 
(Sunstein and Hastie 2014a,b).  
Motivated Cognition. The desire to fit into an identity group can bias the 
processing of factual information even at a cognitive level (e.g., 
Spiekermann and Weiss 2016). For example, Kahan et al. (2012) describe 
how different political-cultural backgrounds create different pressures to 
seek or avoid information about climate change and to process that 
information in biased ways. Kahan et al.’s left-liberal subjects believe that 
climate change is a problem, right-libertarians much less so. Scientific or 
numeracy skills further increase this divergence, suggesting that better 
understanding leads to even more biased processing. 
Epistemic Injustice. Someone suffers epistemic injustice if she is “wronged 
specifically in her capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007, 20). Fricker 
distinguishes between testimonial and hermeneutic injustice. Testimonial 
injustice is experienced if testimony is discounted because of an identity 
                                                          
7 Note that Ann implicitly assumes that the others do not vote strategically, hence that their 
votes are evidence for what option is correct. Game-theoretically, the example shows that it may 
not be a (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium that everyone votes truthfully. Interestingly, there are many 
‘bad’ equilibria, such as everyone voting for option y regardless of private information; here y 
wins even when all private information supports x. 
prejudice. The evidence of a person of minority background might be 
dismissed because of his minority background. Hermeneutic injustice arises 
if oppressed individuals or groups do not have adequate concepts to 
conceive of, make sense of, or communicate their experiences. For 
example, Fricker explains that victims of sexual harassment found it difficult 
to understand their experience and explain it to others before the term 
‘sexual harassment’ was coined. Testimonial and hermeneutic injustice 
undermine the ability of individual and ultimately the group to make correct 
decisions or form true beliefs. 
Epistemic Skepticism and Nihilism. Another threat to epistemic success is 
the refusal to take a truth-seeking attitude. Epistemic skepticism is the belief 
that there is no truth to be tracked or that access to the truth is impossible. 
It can be distinguished from epistemic nihilism, the view that truth does not 
matter, regardless of whether it exists or not. While skepticism may be 
sometimes be justified, nihilism is not. Harry Frankfurt (2005) has suggested 
that the lack of care for the truth is one aspect of “bullshitting”, a lack of 
commitment to the truth and epistemic norms of truthfulness (cf. Cassam 
2019, especially ch. 4). The so-called “fake news” phenomenon seems 
fueled by epistemic nihilism, though the debate about this is still in its infancy 
(e.g., Mukerji 2018, Goodin and Spiekermann 2018, ch. 21). The skepticism 
or nihilism of individuals can scale up to the group level, undermining the 
truth-tracking ability of media organizations, public forums, or the political 
system as a whole. 
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